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Abstract
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs, have come to play a
large role in bringing together small and large investors in the acquisition
and expansion of private companies. A pessimistic version of this relatively
recent alternative to conventional initial public offerings (IPOs), and other
methods of investing in companies ready to expand, is that clever sharks
take advantage of overly optimistic and ill-informed small investors. This
Article offers a very different view. It shows that common investors need
someone to locate good investment opportunities, and then often also
benefit if another well-informed party can credibly vouch for the entity that
claims to have found a good target. It also suggests the development of
other means of vouching for parties that claim to have found worthy targets
for investment.
The analysis focuses first on SPACs that have recently arisen to play the
important role of finding targets and then on PIPEs (Private Investor(s) in
Public Equity) that serve the role of evaluating and certifying those SPACs.
Each of these is rewarded for what it does along the “financing chain.”
SPACs and PIPEs are to be welcomed rather than feared, and they are not
unlike parties that discover and vouch for good products and ideas in other
sectors. Small investors would benefit from knowing when and at what
prices potential PIPEs turned down deals, and they might benefit if SPAC
founders earned lower rewards as the period during which they have use of
investors’ funds comes towards an end. The discussion shows how these
problems are related to those found in other markets, such as the
information consumers can (and cannot) derive from knowledge about a
large purchase that preceded them. Hertz’s purchase of a Toyota, and
Warren Buffett’s purchase of stock, is not terribly different from a PIPE’s
purchase of a SPAC.
Recent literature has strongly criticized SPAC founders, and the
absence of much legal oversite, for aggressively seeking compensation at
*
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the expense of common investors. For most SPACs, founders must close a
deal within two years in order to receive compensation. It is plausible that
founders will rush to find a target as the deadline approaches. While
investors have the right to exit the SPAC at the price that they paid (known
as a redemption right), they may believe that the SPAC has finally found a
good investment—even in the final hour. To assess investor redemptions
and deadlines, we construct a sample of 87 SPACs that completed an IPO
between June 2015 and December 2018, and then merged with a target
before June 2022. The data suggest that investors do not regularly exit as
the two-year deadline approaches but instead often give the founder a
single extension before growing impatient. We find that each additional day
toward a three-year deadline increases redemption rates. Given the
founders’ urge to close, we might expect the contractual rules governing
investor exit, as well as stock exchange listing rules governing deadlines, to
change so that SPACs are no longer rushed. This might be done in several
ways, including a sliding scale reduction in the ownership retained by the
SPAC as the search period proceeds. In the interim, a partial solution to
this end-period problem seems to have emerged, though SPAC critics do
not seem to have noticed the end-period problem or the evolving solution to
it. In sum, investors rely on SPACs to discover targets; they will grant
extensions, but grow impatient and eventually exit as should be expected.
Moreover, they rely on—and pay—sophisticated investors, in the form of
PIPEs, to evaluate SPACs.
Finally, this Article suggests alternatives to SPACs that might arise with
a little help from changes in law. Prediction markets could aggregate
information possessed by many small parties. SPACs themselves, or yet
other providers, might offer insurance against the possibility of a target
whose bad quality can be detected only with factfinding that is difficult for
dispersed, small investors to obtain. Finally, the analysis suggests that
SPACs represent a new way of dealing with strategic investors who holdout for more than their fair share of a discovery.
INTRODUCTION
A special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is a shell corporation
formed with the purpose of bringing together small and large investors in
the acquisition of a private company.1 A SPAC can be understood as an
1

SPACs follow a general pattern of development consisting of legal formation, SEC
registration of redeemable securities for cash, roadshow, initial public offering,
identification and shareholder approval of target, and finally, business combination of the
target and SPAC. See Yochanan Shachmurove & Milos Vulanovic, Specified Purpose
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alternative to an IPO (initial public offering),2 a sale to a large entity or
private set of investors, or even to large-scale financing by a bank or other
lender.3 Each of these is a means of growing an idea and small organization
into a larger and better financed one; each is an attempt to scale up an entity
that is already in progress. A pessimistic version of all these methods is that
their real purpose is to allow an intermediary to profit from some investors‟
overconfidence. An optimistic view is that market forces will eliminate any
excess profits, and that SPACs, in particular, offer small investors a chance
to engage in what private equity companies have been doing for some time.4
While the finance literature has focused on empirically identifying the
drivers of long-term performance of the acquisition, lawyers have raised
concerns about the compensation of SPAC promoters and the favorable
terms offered to institutional investors in SPACs.5 They point to steep postAcquisition Company IPOs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IPOS 301, 314 (Douglas
Cumming & Sofia Johan eds., 2019) (describing the SPAC lifecycle); see also Douglas
Cumming, Lars Helge Haß & Dennis Schweizer, The Fast Track IPO: Success Factors for
Taking Firms Public with SPACs 47 J. BANKING & FIN. 47 192, 201 (2014) (providing
graphical representation).
2
An initial public offering (IPO) is a process that a private company uses to sell shares
to the public, before the stock trades on an exchange. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard
and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 715 (2005). The shares are
offered at a price determined by an underwriter, and are often sold to the underwriter‟s
preferred institutional client-investors, such as pension and mutual funds. Id. The private
company selling its stock receives the proceeds from the sale after accounting for
underwriting and other banking fees. Institutional investors who purchase the initial
offering of shares either hold them for a time or sell them immediately to their preferred
clients. For example, Fidelity, a mutual fund, provides access to IPOs led by underwriter
Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts for its customers who hold at least $100,000 in assets. See
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/stock-trading/ipos (last
visited Feb. 14, 2022). Fidelity customers who hold at least $500,000 are able to access
IPOs underwritten by Credit Suisse. Id. If the initial investors decide to sell their shares
later, they may do so on a stock exchange. Smaller, public investors, sometimes called
retail investors, can then purchase shares of the company, though often at substantially
higher prices. See Hurt, supra note 2 at 715-16.
3
See, e.g., Johannes Kolb & Tereza Tykvova, Going Public Via Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies: Frogs Do Not Turn into Princes 40 J. CORP. FIN. 80, 80 (2016)
(noting that SPACs can be understood as alternatives to IPOs and that SPAC activity
generally increases when traditional IPO activity decreases).
4
The origins of organized private equity are often traced to two firms established in
1946, the American Research and Development Corporation and J.H. Whitney &
Company. See SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE POWER LAW: VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE
MAKING OF THE NEW FUTURE 24-26 (2022). Sequoia Capital, which Mallaby considers the
leading venture partnership in Silicon Valley, has generated returns of about twelve times
investor‟s money since the early 2000s. ID. at 58.
5
On longer-term financial performance, see Minmo Gahng, Jay R. Ritter & Donghang
Zhang,
SPACs
(Dec.
14,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript)

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036767

4

SPACs, PIPEs, AND COMMON INVESTORS

[17-Jun-22

merger declines in value as evidence that insiders profit handsomely at the
expense of earlier, non-professional investors who are diluted along the
SPAC financing chain.6 There is an additional concern that SPACs attract
innocent investors by making wild claims in unregulated prospectuses;
inexperienced investors might be drawn to SPACs because they are unable
to obtain information that venture capitalists can access, and in their
enthusiasm might not notice the returns taken away by the SPAC
intermediaries they deploy.7 For these reasons, it has been suggested that
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=3775847). On concerns with promoter compensation and
preferential treatment for large investors, see Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge &
Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 YALE J. REG. 228, 246 (2022). Not all lawyers
think SPACs are always to be despised. See Emily Strauss, Suing SPACs, (Feb 9. 2022)
(unpublished manuscript), for evidence that many of the lawsuits against SPACs are
opportunistic.
6
For example, Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan examine the mean performance of 47
SPACs that merged between 2019 and 2020 and find positive unadjusted returns of 19.1%
twelve months following the merger. See Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan, supra note 5 at 256.
However, when compared to returns of an IPO index, the NASDAQ, and the Russell 2000,
SPACs underperformed to the tune of -50.9%, -17.9%, and -4.4%. Id. SPAC investors
would have done better to purchase securities indexed to those markets.
Interestingly, the authors divide the 47 SPACs into two groups: 24 with high-quality
sponsor teams and 23 with low-quality teams. Id. SPACs with high-quality sponsor teams
perform very well: mean excess returns of the merged firm over the IPO index, NASDAQ,
and Russell 2000 are -2.8%, 29.9%, and 43.9%. Id. Thus, a small non-redeeming investor
who is able to exclude low-quality sponsors will do very well investing in SPACs and
retaining ownership in the merged firm. High quality sponsor teams may be fairly easy to
identify. Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan designate such teams as private equity funds listed in
PitchBook that manage at least $1 billion of assets or have as a member of the sponsor
team a former senior officer of a Fortune 500 company. Id. at 252. All other sponsor teams
are considered low-quality.
Suppose small investors can easily identify the high-quality teams, but have trouble
pinpointing the low-quality ones, and deploy some rough, aggregate measure like average
quality. This measure partially excludes some low-quality sponsors, but allows for others,
and can be understood as a back-of-the-napkin estimate of small investor learning. Suppose
further that average quality sponsors generate approximately average returns as reported by
Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan. That is, average quality sponsors generate excess returns of 2.8%, 29.9%, and 43.9%. If small investors flip a coin to determine whether the sponsor
team is of average or high quality, they can generate an expected positive return in excess
to a basic investment in the NASDAQ or Russell 2000 across the 47 SPACs. For the
NASDAQ, this expected excess return can be calculated as: (50% × -17.9%) + (50% ×
29.9%) = -8.7% + 14.95% = 6.25%. For the Russell 2000, the expected excess return is
(50% × -4.4%) + (50% × 43.9%) = -2.2% + 21.95% = 19.75%. (Of course, small public
investors do not have access to IPO markets but, if they did, they should invest there:
expected excess returns of mergers with average and high quality SPAC sponsors is a
dismal -26.85%.)
7
See Amanda Rose, SPAC Mergers, IPOS, and the PSLRA‟s Safe Harbor: Unpacking
Claims of Regulatory Arbitrage *19-20 (Oct. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://ssrn.com/abstract=3945975) (noting that “[u]nsophisticated retail investors might
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the SEC require SPACs to disclose estimates of the net cash per share
delivered to the target, price per share paid by large (PIPE)8 investors, and
the sponsor and target management‟s financial interest in the transaction.9
These additional disclosures are meant to clarify SPAC costs (and sponsor
incentives) and help close the gap between pre- and post-merger value.
While many sophisticated observers believe that SPAC shareholders
receive, on average, a bad bargain because their shares are subject to
dilutions, as explained presently, there is less of an argument to be made for
protecting target management from aggressive sponsors.10 The relevant gap
for assessing the target‟s bargain is the difference between the value of all
of the securities delivered by the target and the amount of cash delivered by
the SPAC.11 Computed in this manner, targets generally do well postmerger. Recent estimates of the costs of accessing public equity markets
with a SPAC are actually less than an IPO in terms of the accessing firm‟s
market capitalization, valued one year from the date of the merger or
offering (and adjusted for growth in the market).12 This is consistent with
our suggestion, discussed below, that sponsors provide significant expertise
and often become part of targets‟ management teams, as they materialize
over time.13 In short, as we will show or at least theorize, SPACs are a
also place undue faith in even honestly prepared, well-diligenced financial forecasts—
allowing themselves to get whipped up into a speculative frenzy.”). In contrast to forwardlooking statements contained within the prospectus of an initial public offering, forwardlooking statements contained within SPAC prospectuses are thought to generate minimal
private litigation risk because of the safe harbor provision of the Private Litigation
Securities Reform Act. See John C. Coates, SPAC Law and Myths *6 (Feb. 11, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=4022809) (noting application of the
safe harbor as well as its various exceptions).
8
PIPE is an acronym for Private Investment in Public Equity. Normally, an issuer of a
PIPE sells shares of common stock at a discount from its market price. The discounted
shares are purchased by institutional investors. These purchases are known as PIPE
investments. See John D. Hogboom, Private Investment in Public Equity: An Overview,
177 N.J.L.J. 620, 620 (2004). PIPE investments in discounted common stock are often
“sweetened” with warrants that allow the holder to purchase shares at a higher price later.
Id. Throughout the text, we occasionally refer to the institutional investor as the “PIPE”, or
the Private Investor in Public Equity.
9
See Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan, supra note 5 at 283.
10
The tendency toward dilution is discussed infra § I.
11
See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 5.
12
From January 2019 to June 2020, the costs of the median IPO amounted to 4.8%
compared to 3.5% for SPACs. See Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruhan, supra note 5 at 300-01.
Klausner, Ohlrogee, & Ruan calculate target costs as 3.5% of post-merger market
capitalization, valued one year from the date of the merger and adjusting for growth in the
NASDAQ. Id. at 301. When adjusted for growth of a standard IPO index, target costs
amount to a negative 2.7%, a comparative savings of 7.5% for targets. Id.
13
See infra § II.A.
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response to a need in the market, and they are getting a bad reputation for
the wrong reasons. SPACs have evolved as a sensible way to link several
steps in a process of business formation that can appeal to public
investors.14
I. THE PROBLEM OF SHAREHOLDER DILUTION
A typical SPAC attracts providers of capital, or outside investors, whose
interests are then diluted over time.15 This dilution, and the original
arrangement that begins the SPAC chain, is at first puzzling because these
investors ought to anticipate future reductions. Their equity is subject to
several dilutions because of the preferential treatment given to insiders (as
well as an important later investor, a PIPE, as introduced presently). The
easiest way to catalog these dilutions is to chart the chronology of a typical
deal. SPACs are created by “sponsors,” or “promoters,” who initially
purchase 20% to 25% of the SPAC‟s shares at a nominal price.16 Sponsors
then take the SPAC on a roadshow and court early investors, much as
occurs in the case of most IPOs, but here these investors are asked to buy in
to the ability of the sponsors to find worthy targets, inasmuch as the
potential investors do not yet know what business, or target, the sponsor
will eventually bring to the table for approval.17 These “IPO-stage”
investors are enticed with warrants and other contractual claims on the
future business combination. Underwriter fees accrue at this time.18
Upon completion of the IPO, the SPAC begins to trade on an exchange.
Retail and other investors have a period in which they can purchase units
that will soon divide into conventional shares and warrants; the latter can be
thought of as relatively low-cost options. Once the units separate, investors
are able to purchase shares and warrants separately. During this “pre-deal”
period, while sponsors are searching for a target, the market value of SPAC
shares reflects that of a short-term fixed income investment,19 as well as the
14

To be sure, some SPACs play a different role as discussed below at § II.B.
See Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan, supra note 5 at 246-52 (cataloging and explaining
the sources of SPAC share dilution).
16
Id. at 246-47.
17
See supra note 1.
18
These typically amount to 5.5% of IPO proceeds. A sum of 2% is paid at the time of
the IPO. An additional 3.5% is deferred until the time of merger. See Robert Armstrong,
SPAC’s
Fee
Problem,
FINANCIAL
TIMES,
Sept.
30,
2021,
https://www.ft.com/content/6b1d70db-edae-474c-bd6f-bb60dfa99c51.
Sometimes
underwriters agree to give up their deferred fees. See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 5
at *16.
19
See SPAC Research Pre-Deal, http://www.spacresearch.com/symbol, (last visited
15
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expected value of a merger. Investors who believe that the SPAC will fail to
find a suitable target, for example, can sell or sell short. Other investors
may believe that an excellent sponsor will succeed, while others might
simply find themselves in the right circumstances.20
Once a SPAC identifies a target company and reaches a merger
agreement with it—involving a promise of a substantial cash infusion that
will allow the target to expand—public shareholders of the SPAC vote
whether to approve the proposed business combination.21 Separately, each
public shareholder decides whether to redeem shares.22 If many public
shareholders exit through redemption, as is often the case, then there is less
cash to deliver to the target. Importantly, redeeming investors are permitted
to keep their warrants and other claims, which must be purchased and
satisfied by the business combination—presumably if it is successful
enough that the warrants are exercised in the future.23 The target company
has negotiated for a sum that must be delivered to it regardless of the
amount of cash left in the SPAC after these redemptions. As a result,
sponsors expect cash shortfalls and they routinely search for PIPEs to fill
the gaps because they must satisfy the deals made with their targets.
The timing of PIPE commitments can vary. Some SPACs engage in a
“pre-PIPE” process with a handful of accredited investors in order to gauge
Feb. 19, 2022). As of the time of this writing, there are 603 pre-deal SPACs currently
searching for a target. The amount of cash paid from the trust for each SPAC share is
greater than or equal to its initial purchase price of $10.00. Id.
20
For an example, see Markets Insider, IPOF Stock Alert: What Are the SPAC Merger
Rumors
Lifting
IPOF
Shares
Today?,
(Feb.
18,
2022),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/ipof-stock-alert-what-are-the-spacmerger-rumors-lifting-ipof-shares-today-1031209671, which notes:
IPOF stock isn‟t just any blank-check firm. It‟s the sixth in a series of SPACs
launched by famed venture capitalist Chamath Palihapitiya. Mr. Palihapitiya
saw incredible success in bringing companies public in 2020 and 2021… IPOF
does not yet have a merger partner.
21
See Kristi Marvin, Why is Marketing a SPAC’s Acquisition So Important?, SPAC
INSIDER, Jun. 5, 2019, https://spacinsider.com/2019/06/05/spacs-business-combinationmarketing/
22
The redemption option means that there is a money-back guaranty for SPAC
investors. Unit holders are allowed to keep (or sell) their warrants even when they redeem
their shares. For a time, redemption required voting against the proposed merger, so that a
kind of consistency was required as is normally the case for one who seeks the appraisal
remedy in the case of a merger. See Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and
Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 910 (2013) (noting that early
SPACs required at least 80% approval of common shares). For the most part, SPACs no
longer require this consistency.
23
See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 5 at *2.
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the level of PIPE interest prior to launching a formal process.24 Others may
engage in a “PIPE upsize” process whereby existing PIPE investors
contribute additional cash after the merger is announced and the level of
redemptions is assessed.25 It should be obvious that the more desperate are
the sponsors to close a deal, the more attractive the terms a PIPE can secure.
Sponsors have contracted for, and announced, their own compensation, and
they will not be paid if the SPAC cannot reach its cash commitment to the
target, and the deadline to complete a merger expires. If a sponsor expects
high redemptions and a shortfall in the cash required to deliver to a target,
PIPEs (and for that matter, any other strategic investor) can therefore secure
more favorable terms. This phenomenon is amplified inasmuch as demand
for SPAC financing is high and the supply of PIPEs is low, perhaps because
PIPEs must invest in discovering facts about each potential investment. Put
differently, there are many optimistic businesses that want to be targets, but
fewer investors who will put in the time and effort to study a given potential
target. In turn, sponsors incentivize PIPEs to transact with them by offering
an interest in the SPAC at prices below that available in the market that
normal investors can access. Deals can be sweetened with convertible debt,
convertible preferred equity, and additional warrants.26 The sponsor can
also replace the standard SPAC units with various combinations of these
securities. Several strategies to complete a deal can be imagined. By and
large, every sweetener to a PIPE dilutes what remains of the stake originally
obtained by the SPAC‟s retail investors.27
In sum, the retail investor in a SPAC faces four sources, or means, of
dilution: (1) shares and warrants that go to compensate founders when a
deal is struck; (2) that extracted by IPO-stage and pre-merger investors,
who are enticed to invest with warrants and other claims that must
eventually be paid by a successful business combination; (3) fees paid to
underwriters and other service providers, for carrying out the transaction;
and finally, (4) the warrants, preferred shares, and especially below-market
24

See Christopher Barlow et al., Choppy Market for SPACs and PIPEs, Competition
for Targets Spurs Deal Innovations, SKADDEN INSIGHTS, (Jan. 19, 2022),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2022/01/2022-insights/corporate/choppymarket-for-spacs-and-pipes.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
PIPE investments need not lead to dilutions. PIPEs may simply purchase the
common stock at market rates. Alternatively, if a PIPE investment increases the number of
shares, as well as the proportional valuation of the business combination, then the value of
the outstanding shares remains constant. Without warrants, the investment actually
decreases dilution since the value of the outstanding warrants will be reduced by the
issuance of new shares.
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priced shares that entice, and go to, PIPEs.
Commentators have suggested that the relevant gap for assessing the
magnitude of dilutions to the normal SPAC shareholder is the difference
between the purchase price of a SPAC share (standardized at $10.00) and
the amount of cash per share left in the SPAC upon delivery to the target.
An estimate of this difference from January 2019 to June 2020, for the
median SPAC, is $5.70.28 If so, the target must indeed be well chosen for
the original investment by the public investor to be worthwhile.
In the absence of an experiment that randomly dilutes completed SPAC
deals, it is difficult to identify any causal effect of shareholder dilution on
the longer term performance of the business combination. For example, an
investment made in SPACs over 2019 to mid-2020 earned, on average,
17.9% less than an investment indexed to the NASDAQ.29 This might seem
to indicate that highly diluted SPACs attract poor targets because weak
targets accept bad deals. However, the relationship could be reversed (or
simultaneous) so that good targets may (partly) generate poor returns
because the business combination begins with diluted shares. Because of
this possibility, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a causal
relationship between shareholder dilution and the performance of a business
combination. As already noted, the same study demonstrates that SPACs
that are created by “high-quality” sponsors can yield excess returns even as
shares are diluted.30 But accounting for sponsor quality does not eliminate
the difficulty of identifying a causal effect of dilution. It is simply another
variable that is correlated with both share dilution and the performance of
the merged firm. At this point we are unable to say much about the success
or failure of the SPAC strategy; ours is a theory and not one that has gamechanging empirical support.
Standard econometrics might deploy an “instrumental variables”
approach; it might search for variables that tightly correlate with share
dilution, but are otherwise unrelated to merger performance. The
relationship between the instrument and share dilution could then be
isolated, and subsequently used to analyze whether the sequestered effect of
share dilution has any causal impact on the performance of the business
combination. Finding a credible instrument is likely impossible, however,
because any variable correlated with share dilution is, in all likelihood,
correlated with merger performance just as well.
28

Klausner, Ohlrogge & Ruan, supra note 5 at 246.
See supra note 6.
30
Id.
29
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II. THE SPAC FINANCING CHAIN
As noted earlier, a SPAC sponsor, or founder, often in the form of a
team, aims to find a target company that is privately held. The sponsor
attracts funds and helps the target go public and grow.31 Technically, the
target will be merged with the SPAC. At the time of their investment in the
publicly traded but empty SPAC, investors do not know the identity of the
target that the sponsor will discover. The sponsor names a period, typically
two years, for it to discover a target;32 if no target is found in this period, the
SPAC is dissolved and investors receive their money back with a modest
interest rate.33 If there is a discovery, and a merger deal with the target, the
sponsor is rewarded; this is because the sponsor has “purchased” 20 or 25%
of the SPAC‟s shares at a nominal price, perhaps $25,000.34 Sponsors gain
yet more from a successful identification and merger process because they
are normally able to buy warrants in the SPAC prior to its IPO, though these
come at a cost.35 Often, sponsors must purchase warrants that total 2.5 to 3
percent of SPAC proceeds in order to be able to purchase shares at a
nominal price.36 For a SPAC that raises $100 million, for instance, sponsors
would need to purchase $2.5 to $3.0 million worth of warrants. The
31

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
When a SPAC is listed on a securities exchange, it must find a target within three
years. See NYSE Listing Manual 102.6; NASDAQ Listing Rule 5510. However, SPACs
may and do often opt for shorter periods of 18 to 24 months. See What You Need to Know
About SPACs—Updated Investor Bulletin, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
May 25, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/what-you-needknow-about-spacs-investor-bulletin.
33
Cash held in the trust is typically invested in U.S. Treasuries. Redeeming investors
receive a pro rata share of the cash on deposit in the trust account. In order to satisfy
exchange rules, at least 90% of gross IPO proceeds must be deposited in the trust, so
investors stand to lose very little if they do not gain a modest return. See NYSE Listing
Manual 102.6; NASDAQ Listing Rule 5510. As of the time of this writing, all live SPACs
are trading at or above $10.00 per share, which means that redeeming investors would earn
a modest gain or have their money returned. SPAC Research, Pre-Deal (last visited Feb.
14, 2022), https://www.spacresearch.com/symbol?s=pre-deal&sector=&geography=.
34
For most transactions, investors purchase Class A shares that come with voting and
redemption rights. Sponsors purchase Class B shares, which come with neither right, but
convert to Class A shares if a merger is completed. The converted shares must be held for a
time before they can be sold. For instance, a sponsor may pay $25,000 for 5,000,000 Class
B shares, or ½ cent per share. See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 5 at *1.
35
Id. at 2.
36
See Steve Hills & Justin Burchett, SPAC Warrants, Founders’ Shares, PIPEs: What
Practitioners Should Know, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INTERNATIONAL, May 25, 2021,
https://www.financialexecutives.org/FEI-Daily/May-2021/SPAC-Warrants,Founders%E2%80%99-Shares,-PIPEs-What-Pract.aspx.
32
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sponsor‟s stock and warrants are subject to a required holding period and,
unlike warrants available to investors who buy SPAC shares, the warrants
bought by the sponsor often cannot be redeemed unless transferred to a
third party.37
Initial investors, who might be large investors, must then vote to
approve the acquisition of the target and join in the surviving business;
alternatively, they can exit and take away the amounts they invested plus
interest—but they can hold on to some warrants in the ongoing SPAC.38
Insolvency aside, it looks like an investment that cannot go wrong, unless
these are investors who prefer to invest in risky businesses. In this one, at
least, they either get their money back with interest or the opportunity to
stay on board after they see the target.
A. The Role of the Sponsor
The growing literature on SPACs does not sufficiently appreciate the
role, or roles, that SPACs play in the market. A successful sponsor should
be understood as doing several things. (1) Discovery: The sponsor must
identify a private company with good prospects, and it must do so within a
specified time period. (2) Deal-Making: The sponsor must negotiate with
this privately-owned target about the terms of the merger between the target
and the SPAC. (3) Management: The sponsor often takes part in the
management of the enlarged, merged company, so that the sponsor provides
guidance or management—in much the same way that a venture capitalist,
not to mention one of the investors on Shark Tank, remains involved with
its targets. Here, small investors are offered the opportunity to invest in the
shark; SPACs offer small investors a “poor” person‟s alternative to the
venture capital world.39 (4) PIPE-Dealing: Given that many of the initial
investors in the SPAC will depart and take out their investments while
holding on to warrants (even if these warrants are soon sold), the company
will often need more capital, so that the sponsor (as part of its deal with the
target) needs to attract and negotiate with a PIPE (private investment in
public equity) that may receive a preferential price per share.40 The PIPE‟s
willingness to invest in the ongoing SPAC, with the target now identified by
the founder, is an important signal to original investors in the SPAC who
had remained, as well as to new investors in the ongoing SPAC. Indeed, a
37

See id. (providing an example of typical terms of sponsor warrants).
See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 32.
39
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
40
For the 47 SPACs examined by Klausner, Ohlrogge & Kuan, the median discount
given to PIPEs is 5.5%. Klausner, Ohlrogge & Kuan, supra note 5 at 239.
38
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PIPE‟s role is so important that it might seem surprising that the small,
public investors‟ redemption, or money-back guarantee, right has remained
in place in the world of SPACs. In any event, the SPAC at this point is
much more than a shell company.
From a small investor‟s point of view, an investment in a SPAC is a bet
on the ability of the sponsor to identify, and then manage, a target
company.41 The two functions are often inseparable (a combination that is
familiar to those who follow the popular program, Shark Tank). The
sponsor may have real skill in discovering prospects, but the evaluation of
this skill over time does depend on the management of the target as well as
the true price paid for the target. For example, a given sponsor may be right
that electric bikes are the thing of the future in a given location, but if an
investment in such an enterprise fails, it may be because the idea was
excellent, but the execution of the idea was faulty. Future investors will not
know if this sponsor is good at discovery or good at managing—or good at
neither. If only the sponsor had selected and worked with many businesses
in the past, an investor might easily evaluate the sponsor‟s ability to
discover and to manage. In fact, each discovered business might take a few
years to succeed or fail, and a sponsor who is spread very thin introduces
the variable of sub-managers. It will be rare for a sponsor to build up a
sufficient history for investors to know whether it is good at discovery or
managing.42 A given sponsor may be skilled when it comes to execution, or
41

Recent litigation over application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA)
considers whether SPACs should be considered operating companies or “inadvertent
investment companies.” The question can be traced back to In the matter of The Tonopah
Mining Company of Nevada, 26 S.E.C. 426, 1947 SEC LEXIS 321, distinguishing
operating companies from securities, or holding, firms. See, e.g, Assad v. E.Merge
Technology Acquisition Corp, Case 1:21-cv-07072-JPO, (Aug. 20, 2021) (S.D.N.Y.). If
considered an operating company, then a SPAC remains free from ICA compliance rules.
If considered an investment company, then a SPAC may be required to comply after a
twelve-month grace period. Any analysis of SPAC categorization, whether guided by
Tonopah, or otherwise, should consider the sponsor‟s role. The SPAC‟s managers search
for targets, negotiate merger terms, and then eventually manage the business combination.
Its role is that of an active operator.
42
Successful experience as a corporate executive can suggest good management skills.
Private equity firm experience can serve as a proxy for discovering good targets. Indeed, a
current trend in SPACs is private equity firm sponsorship. See supra note 6. However, both
are proxies and are not perfect substitutes for SPACs, which present different variables.
Some SPACs include celebrities within their sponsorship teams. See Bailey Lipschultz,
Celebrity SPACs Leave Famous Winners Looking More Like Losers, BLOOMBERG
MARKETS, (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-1216/celebrity-spacs-leave-famous-winners-looking-more-like-losers. Because their role can
be understood as advertorial and unrelated to target identification and management,
instances of celebrity SPACs should be expected to decline.
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management, but these skills are wasted on a target that simply had a poor
idea in the first place. A successful startup is a combination of an idea and
of management, and it is normally hard to see which of the two was more
important in bringing about success or failure.43
When the SPAC founder solicits investors, the founder offers to find a
suitable target within a period of time; two years is common as noted
earlier, though the period can be as long as three years.44 In turn, the
SPAC‟s discovery is less promising as the stated period comes close to
expiration, because investors know that the SPAC will become desperate in
the face of the requirement that it must return the capital entrusted to it;
after all, the founder is enriched only if it finds a target that it can pass off
as appealing. This two-year period therefore seems unstable. We might
expect the contractual rules governing redemptions or warranties to change
so that SPACs are no longer rushed to find a target at the end of the two
year period. This might be done in several ways, including a sliding scale
reduction in the ownership retained by the SPAC as the search period
proceeds. In the interim, a partial solution to this end-period problem seems
to have emerged, though SPAC critics do not seem to have noticed the endperiod problem or the evolving solution to it.
1. Data
To assess the relationship between redemption rates and SPAC closing
deadlines, we construct a sample of 87 SPACs that completed an initial
public offering between July 2015 and December 2018 and then
successfully completed a business combination on or before June 2022.45
To our knowledge, they represent all SPACs that satisfy these two criteria.
Summary statistics of redemption rates are presented below.

43

Any reader who is devoted to the television program, Shark Tank, is familiar with
this pattern. Still, there are exceptions to the problem of discovering a sponsor‟s talents. If
there are many new businesses pursuing the same idea, and only one fails, it can be inferred
that it was poorly managed. But most target companies (and sponsors) will not present such
easy opportunities for evaluation.
44
See supra note 32.
45
Gritstone Asset Management provided data on redemption rates and total public
shares. For market variables, we consulted the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis
database. Data on sponsor characteristics was collected from EDGAR (the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system), in particular, S-1 Registration Statements (or
their 4F Form equivalents for private foreign issuers) and 263 Rule 424(b) Prospectuses.
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SPAC Redemption Rates
Mean
0.58311
Median
0.74120
Minimum
0.00000
Maximum
0.99770
Standard Deviation
0.36884

Table 1: SPAC Redemption Rates Summary Statistics, n = 87
The distribution of redemption rates is convex. Twenty-one SPACs
possess redemption rates of less than 20 percent. Thirty-seven SPACs have
redemption rates of more than 80 percent; most of the common investors
take their money and run, while hanging on to warrants. Investors redeem
between 20 and 80 percent of shares for the remaining twenty-nine SPACs
in our sample.

Figure 1: SPAC Redemption Rate Frequency Distribution, n = 87
Consider, then, the relationship between redemption rates and the
closing deadlines that sponsors confront. Sponsors facing deadlines may
rush to close weak deals. On the other hand, most investors will know this,
and they will depart, whether or not they take the opportunity to vote
against the merger that a sponsor proposes. Alternatively, if the sponsor and
the investors think that with some more time the sponsor can find or
consummate a deal in the near future, the investors can help the sponsor
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extend the search period. The sponsor will get something if a minimally
acceptable deal is completed in the previously announced (normally twoyear) period, but it is easy to see that an extension will often be in the best
interest of the sponsor as well as the investors. Additional search can lead to
discovery or completion of a profitable business combination. Investors
who continue to have confidence in the sponsor‟s skill at discovery, or
believe that the market is ripe, or actually observe that the sponsor is close
to completing a good deal, will favor allowing more time for search. But at
some point, investors will become impatient, and lose confidence in any
claim made by the sponsor; they know that the sponsor has reason to rush as
the announced time for a discovery comes to an end and, for most investors,
it is likely that one extension is more than enough. Asking for multiple
extensions is either a signal that the sponsor is less capable than previously
thought, or that the market does not offer suitable targets. Sponsors are
aware of this, of course, and it is unsurprising that at present the market
favors a two-year period followed by a fair number of (just) one year
extensions.
Available data support this theory. For each SPAC in our sample, we
compute the number of days that pass from IPO to business combination.
Summary statistics are presented below.
Number of Days from IPO to Business Combination
Mean
703.91
Median
694.00
Minimum
248.00
Maximum
1307.0
Standard Deviation
246.70

Table 2: Days Passed from IPO to Business Combination
Summary Statistics, n = 87
The distribution of number of days passed is concave. Twelve SPACs
close within 450 days; the sponsors did not rush at day one to claim
rewards, but searched for a reasonable period and avoided any fear that they
rushed to completion before the expiration of a two-year (730 day) period.
Nine SPACs close after 980 days. The remaining sixty-six SPACs close
between 450 and 980 days.
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Figure 2: Days Passed from IPO to Business Combination
Frequency Distribution, n = 87
In addition to redemption rates and length of time to merger, we collect
a set of control variables—some of which prove useful in thinking about the
role played by PIPEs as discussed presently in Section B. We take account
of the number of public shares issued, a set of measures for market
conditions (including year dummies),46 and a set of measures for sponsor
characteristics. The latter consist of the size of the sponsor team, the team‟s
average age, whether the team includes a female, the gender of the CEO,
whether the CEO has prior experience as a CEO at a public company, and
whether the CEO has completed a Ph.D., MBA, J.D., or graduated from an
Ivy League school. A list of the controls, along with summary statistics, is
provided below.
Variable
Total Public Shares
T-Bill Rate
Russell 2000
VIX
Year 2015
Year 2016

Mean
25,820,000
1.46%
1470.20
14.15
-

N
8
8

46

Specifically, they are the rate for 13-week treasuries, the value of the Russell 2000
index, and the value of VIX (all at the time of IPO). Year dummies are assigned on the
basis of IPO date.
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Year 2017
Year 2018
Size of Sponsor Team
Average Age of Sponsors
Sponsor Team Includes Woman? (1 = yes)
CEO Gender (1 = man)
CEO Prior Experience? (1 = yes)
CEO Ph.D.? (1 = yes)
CEO MBA? (1 = yes)
CEO J.D.? (1 = yes)
CEO Ivy League? (1 = yes)

6.6
53.038
-

17

29
42
53
84
63
12
45
12
42

Table 3: Control Variables with Summary Statistics, n = 87
2. Empirical Analysis
We first examine a scatter-plot of number of days passed between IPO
and business combination versus redemption rates. The plot shows a clear
relationship between the two variables.

Figure 3: Number of Days from IPO to Business Combination versus
Redemption Rate (with least squares fit)
We next regress redemption rate on days passed and the complete set of
controls in column (1). Days passed is significant at conventional levels. In
column (2), insignificant variables are dropped and redemption rate is
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regressed again. Days passed remains significant at conventional levels.
Outcome variable: Redemption Rate
(1)
(2)
Constant
−0.00348 (1.12740)
−0.07803 (0.23168)
SPAC Features
Days IPO-BC
0.00047 *** (0.00015)
0.00043 *** (0.00013)
Public Shares
−7.17e-09 *** (2.14e-09) −7.13e-09 *** (1.76e-09)
Market Features
T-Bill Rate
−0.20219 (0.15484)
Russell 2000
3.27e-05 (0.00078)
VIX
0.00323 (0.01589)
Sponsor Features
Number
0.06023 ** (0.02860)
0.05063 * (0.02598)
Avg. Age
−0.00392 (0.00731)
Female Incl.?
0.31519 ** (0.15722)
0.21195 * (0.12706)
(1 = yes)
CEO Gender
−0.02762 (0.07616)
(1 = man)
CEO Prior Exp.
−0.00331 (0.09176)
(1 = yes)
CEO Ph.D.?
0.03296 (0.11889)
(1 = yes)
CEO MBA?
−0.09437 (0.08214)
(1 = yes)
CEO J.D.?
−0.10703 (0.12962)
(1 = yes)
CEO Ivy?
−0.04116 (0.08508)
(1 = yes)
R-squared
0.38456
0.27664
N
87
87
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Year dummies
insignificant and not reported.

Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates, SPAC IPOs between June
2015 and December 2018 that Successfully Combine Prior to June 2022
We then run a series of robustness checks. First, one-half of the data is
randomly sampled, and the regression in column (2) is estimated again.
Days passed between IPO and business combination remains significant,
but at the 10% level. In addition, the standard error slightly loosens from
0.00015 to 0.00018. Consistent with the theory that sponsors optimally
choose to stop searching for a target in order to maximize their expected
compensation—both because impatient sponsors are willing to settle for a
weak deal and patient sponsors prefer to continue searching only if they can
maintain investor confidence—we restrict the sample on the basis of closing
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before and after two years. First, all transactions that conclude beyond the
standard search time of two years are excluded and the regression is reestimated. Number of days between IPO and business combination does not
significantly impact redemption rates when transactions conclude within
two years. Next, and finally, all transactions that conclude beyond two years
are set aside for estimation. As expected, number of days is significant for
the transactions of this cohort.47 Sponsors may wish to extend, but are less
able to do so because investor confidence in their discovery capabilities
may deteriorate further in response. As anticipated, the data show that
lengthier searches beyond two years cause an increase in redemption rates.
Outcome variable: Redemption Rate
(1)
(2)
Constant
−0.14556 (0.32117)
0.207560 (0.34979)
SPAC Features
Days IPO-BC
0.00022 (0.00044)
0.00053 ** (0.00025)
Public Shares
−9.49e-09 *** (2.32e-09) −2.58e-09 (3.12e-09)
Sponsor Features
Number
0.02641 (0.03681)
0.01525 (0.04180)
Female Incl.?
0.21786 (0.18806)
−0.02958 (0.10481)
(1 = yes)
R-squared
0.34931
0.13792
N
48
39
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Year dummies
insignificant and not reported.

Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates,
SPAC IPOs between June 2015 and December 2018 that Successfully
Combine Prior to June 2022 in Less than and Greater than 730 Days
This analysis is consistent with the theory that sponsors provide a
valuable service to the common investor. Because sponsors identify
profitable targets, investors are willing to extend search periods for a time,
but they will eventually lose confidence and exit.
B. The Role of the PIPE
The difficulty one encounters in judging the performance of a sponsor
explains the role of a PIPE (as well as any venture capitalist), which should
be understood not only as providing capital—which will be of special value
47

As a robustness check, insignificant variables were dropped and the regression reestimated. Days passed is significant at the 1% level, the coefficient slightly increases to
0.00062, and the standard error tightens to 0.00021.
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the more that the original investors exit—but also as providing information
to new investors, and also to earlier investors who have the opportunity to
exit. Any small investor would need to expend a great deal of energy in
evaluating the project and management skills at stake in the new company,
and there is therefore a collective action problem because a single investor
does not have enough at risk to justify a full investigation.48 Many investors
could pool this work, or hire an evaluator, but then they need to evaluate the
evaluator, unless they are able to rely on past experience and reputation.
Inasmuch as sponsors cannot possibly offer evidence of a very large number
of successes, it will be rare for a sponsor to be able to offer convincing
evidence of past performance. One solution is to see whether a large
investor thinks the sponsor has done a good job in choosing a target. In turn,
this large investor, with more at stake, will require payment for the work,
inasmuch as the small investors are, in a sense, hoping to free-ride on the
work of an investor who evaluates the sponsor. The idea is that the sponsor
needs to be rewarded for discovering and managing, and then another party
needs to be rewarded for evaluating the sponsor.49 In the world of SPACs,
these payments, or rewards, are apparently made by giving these parties
stock in the post-takeover SPAC, at preferential prices. The sponsor is
rewarded with stock that comes at very low cost, and is valuable only in the
event of a successful acquisition; meanwhile, the evaluator, or PIPE, that
effectively certifies the sponsor, is rewarded with the ability to buy shares at
a discount price.50 No wonder it must hold these shares for a period of time.
48

Collective action problems, generally, are social dilemmas where all would be better
off cooperating, but none has a personal incentive to do so. See MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965). The
collective action problem facing investors helps explain why small investors, even acting
rationally, have not demanded better disclosures from law. It is important to see that
investors are seeking good returns (and not information), and that sponsors and PIPEs can
evaluate and certify targets that generate those returns independent of the level of
information provided to investors. In general, it should be expected that the importance of
disclosure is increasingly eclipsed by certification and vetting as collective action problems
increase. But the more important point, as stressed presently, is that sponsors and PIPEs
provide skillful identification and evaluation of targets, which is more valuable to investors
than serialized information. As a result, disclosures that focus on keeping sponsors and
PIPEs honest are more valuable than disclosures that provide information about targets
inasmuch as the two do not overlap.
49
This process of identification and evaluation suggests that permitting common
investors to directly purchase shares of targets will accomplish little towards curbing share
dilution and investment in SPACs generally. It is the skillful identification and evaluation
of targets that they are seeking, not access. If other means of identification and evaluation
arise, such as prediction markets or insurance (as suggested infra § IV), then a demand for
direct purchase of shares might increase.
50
PIPEs are rewarded in a variety of ways, one of which is to enjoy priority over
common investors.
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Retail investors pay market price for SPAC shares, while the PIPE
negotiates for a discount. Pre-merger investors are also paid with warrants,
whether stock is purchased during the IPO or on secondary exchanges,51
and this is another way to acquire shares in the evolved SPAC at prices
lower than those paid by late-comers who can see the target and thus
possess more information than the original investors in the blank SPAC.
We do not mean to imply that this relationship among SPACs, PIPEs,
and small investors is a universal one. Some PIPEs put in far more money
than the smaller investors in the original SPAC. In these cases, the SPAC‟s
role is probably to get the company listed in the first place and to create a
market in which shares can be traded.52 These SPACs also play a sensible
role in the market, and can also be thought of as part of the chain. However,
most of the discussion here focuses on (the more interesting and familiar)
cases where SPACs are an important means of gaining access to the capital
offered by small investors.
Another problem with the SPAC-PIPE story offered here is that the
development of PIPEs could have brought about the elimination of the
small investors‟ easy exit option, or money-back guarantee. It did not, but
the problem is not a big one for the theory offered here. First, the presence
of the guarantee encourages the original investment. After all, if a PIPE is
observed entering in a feeble manner, the earlier investors will want to exit,
and they will invest more readily pre-PIPE if they know this is to be a later
option. Second, two guarantees, or signals, are better than one. Still, we
must concede that the argument here proves a little too much. If the
development of the PIPE pattern had been accompanied by a reduction in
the ability to exit at no loss, we would surely claim that our argument about
the role of the PIPE was yet stronger.53
51

See notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
See Matt Levine, Big SPAC Deals Don’t Need Big SPACs, BLOOMBERG LAW, Apr.
13,
2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-13/grab-spac-megamerger-isn-t-mega-without-blackrock-pipe.
53
Of the 47 SPACs examined by Klausner, Ohlrogge & Kuan, 77% received some
amount of PIPE investment. See Klausner, Ohlrogge & Kuan at 245. The fact that some
SPACs receive no help from a PIPE, which could be interpreted as a signal of rejection and
disapproval, may help explain the persistence of the redemption right.
This Article is different from other recent analyses of SPACs in that it offers a
theoretical view without direct empirical observation—apart from the novel analysis of
redemption rates and discovery deadlines supra. Empirical analyses of SPACs suffer from
small sample sizes and a proclivity to make claims based on descriptive statistics. Accurate
causal claims are difficult (if not impossible) to make with larger sample sizes that
aggregate historical SPAC data because today‟s SPACs are not comparable to those that
came before. While aggregated descriptions of a handful of SPACs can be useful if studied
52
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This tidy description of the reward system surrounding a SPAC‟s
formation is, however, subject to a more serious objection. The preferential
stock prices obtained by the sponsor and then by the PIPE seemingly
eliminate any signal or service to the small investor. These intermediaries
may well be paid, as just described, for their evaluative and management
services, but how do investors know that the sponsor and PIPE are not
being overpaid or, what is the same thing, that the SPAC is a good
investment at the higher price required of the common investor? For
example, a PIPE that acquires shares at a price of $8 per share is not really
telling investors that the investment available to them at $10 a share is
worth that amount or more. The PIPE could think it worth $9 in terms of the
present value of future profits, and indeed could be counting on the profit
produced by innocent investors who are paying $10.
1. The Information Benefits of PIPE Deal-Terms to Small Investors
We have seen that the presence of a PIPE provides valuable information
to small, and even unsophisticated, investors. As the sponsor‟s time period
in which to find a target comes to an end, investors are increasingly
skeptical because they recognize that in order to profit, the sponsor must
combine the SPAC with a target, or bring the adventure to an end with no
profit for the sponsor.54 The sponsor‟s choice of a target therefore provides
less valuable information to investors as time goes on. But once a target is
identified, and a deal is struck between the sponsor and the target, the
sponsor now needs to induce a PIPE to join, in order to provide more capital
to the target. At this point, the PIPE has more information than the early
investors, because the target and its arrangement with the sponsor are now
known. Smaller investors cannot avail themselves of the deals offered to the
sponsor or to the PIPE, but at least they can see the identified target—
though they know little about it because information is costly for them to
acquire directly—and, of far greater importance, they can see that a PIPE
has been attracted, even if it enjoys a price that is better than that available
to the less informed investor. If we know that the best informed person in
town is willing to pay $X for a company‟s shares, it is rational for an
uninformed person to pay a bit more than $X for similar shares.
carefully, they also can generate misleading conclusions as any other phenomenon under
study with too few observations. Our own empirical analysis of redemption rates should be
read keeping these caveats in mind. The theoretical claims and suggestions presented here
can be tested as well any other analysis, and we make no claim of superiority (or
inferiority) over other methods.
54
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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To see this somewhat counterintuitive point, consider a buyer who is
choosing whether to purchase a basic Toyota or a comparable car from
Honda. Frequently, the cars look alike, come with similar features, and are
available at very similar prices, with comparable warranties. Online
reviewers extol or criticize their features after short trial runs, but different
reviewers are likely to prefer different vehicles, often for idiosyncratic
reasons. The buyer would like to know more about reliability, future resale
value, likely maintenance costs, and other characteristics that test drives are
unlikely to reveal. A given buyer has neither time nor reason to invest much
in evaluating the car. But now imagine that the individual buyer can observe
that a much larger buyer, like the Avis car rental company has contracted to
buy 3,000 of the Toyota vehicles. Avis will have its own maintenance and
inspection facilities, and Avis will know much more about the vehicles than
a single buyer. To be sure, Avis‟s sizeable transaction will give it a better
per-vehicle price than what is available to an individual, and the fact that
Avis buys the car gives it yet further bargaining power with Toyota. Both
know that Avis‟s choice allows many potential buyers to sample the car as a
rental, and both know that Avis‟s choice tells potential buyers that a very
sophisticated buyer has chosen Toyota over Honda. Still, we have the same
problem as before; if the car is available at $25,000, but Avis is expected to
obtain a discount, normally unknown (but imagine it buys at $22,000 per
vehicle), the typical buyer might reason that Avis values the car at
something on the order of $23,000 and would not have bought the car at the
$25,000 price required of the typical individual purchaser. If so, Avis‟s
choice does not seem to give the one-off buyer valuable information, any
more than the PIPE‟s investment should give the typical investor a positive
signal.
But this is probably faulty reasoning. It is true that Avis is better
situated to evaluate the resale value of its cars than are most owners. Avis is
better informed than the typical buyer, and the one-off buyer might want to
learn from Avis‟s decision. It is also the case that Avis has no direct means
of charging buyers for its information; the presence of new Toyota cars can
be observed at no cost in Avis‟s lots, and the only way Avis can obtain
some compensation for its evaluation effort and information is in the form
of a better price from Toyota, which will then benefit from making more
sales or obtaining a higher price from consumer purchasers. Again, the
problem is that the individual who observes Avis‟s purchases does not
know whether Avis would regard the Toyota as a good purchase if it faced
the same, higher price, required of the individual consumer. Avis might buy
at $23,000 but not at $25,000, in which case the typical consumer would not
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want to buy the car at the price available in the dealership. And yet—and
here is the key to the argument—the same reasoning and problem would
have been present if Avis had selected the Honda vehicle. It too would have
benefited from Avis‟s purchase, so that Honda and Toyota are in similar
positions with respect to Avis. Avis‟s decision to buy from Toyota really
does provide information to the consumer, even though the typical
consumer cannot obtain the better price that is surely available to Avis.
Similarly, a PIPE has numerous firms in which to invest.55 It may even
have multiple sponsors with which to partner. The fact that a PIPE chooses
a given sponsor, when combined with the SPAC‟s selection, does provide
valuable information to relatively ignorant investors. And this is so even
though the consumers, which is to say the common investors, cannot join in
at the same price per share available to the PIPE. The PIPE is in this way
rewarded for its investigative efforts and for the information it provides
smaller investors, even though they can never be sure that the PIPE values
the opportunity at a price equal to or greater than that available to the
smaller investor.
In many cases, the sponsor invests more after discovering the target, and
it may be required to do so by the target, 56 but this is not terribly valuable
information for small investors. After all, the sponsor needs the transaction
to be completed in order to obtain the value of the “free” shares it took at
the outset. If the sponsor retains 20% of the (eventual number of) shares at
the outset, sells 60% in the market, and then 20% to the PIPE at a price
better than that available in the market, it is not terribly useful information
to see that the sponsor purchased one-quarter of the 60% at market value, or
even that the sponsor simply “gave” money to the target in one form or
another. After all, this investment is likely necessary to give value to the
original 20% obtained by the sponsor. It is true that the sponsor, like the
PIPE, also has other places in which to invest, much as Avis could buy
other vehicles, but the return to the sponsor from the survival of the SPACtarget entity is sufficiently great that the fact of the sponsor‟s investment
provides little information to ignorant investors. It is a bit like finding that
Avis was able to buy the Toyota vehicles at $10,000 each; in that case, the
information would be of very little value to an individual purchaser, who
must decide which vehicle to buy at $25,000.

55

This number has been growing. In 2021, 397 IPOs generated proceeds of $142
billion. In contrast, 613 SPACs raised $145 billion and nearly 200 mergers were
completed. Renaissance Capital, US IPO Market 2021 Annual Report, Jan. 3, 2022.
56
See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 5 at *2.
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Tangentially, we might note that if Hertz buys 2,000 of the Honda
vehicles after Avis has bought many of the Toyota vehicles, it is the earlier
Avis purchase that probably provides better information to most consumers.
After all, in our somewhat stylized case, Honda and Hertz both know that if
Hertz now buys the Toyota, consumers will have a yet stronger message
about the relative value of Honda and Toyota‟s vehicles. Honda is thus
induced to offer Hertz a lower price than it offered the first mover, Avis,
and, in turn, consumers should be less certain that Hertz, another wellinformed buyer, assigns a greater value to the Honda vehicle than that
required of the individual consumer. This, in turn, makes the value of the
information provided by Avis yet more valuable, because Avis and Toyota
both know that Honda‟s retail price will go down if Avis waits, and the
differential between the price paid by the rental agency and that available to
the typical consumer will shrink, so that the information provided to the
consumer will be more valuable. This thinking is of interest to game
theorists but it is set aside here because it is unlikely to play a role in the
PIPE-sponsor-target negotiations.
2. The Information Benefits of Failed PIPE Negotiations
Before a sponsor team concludes terms with a PIPE, it likely attempts to
persuade other PIPEs to invest in the SPAC on similar or less favorable
terms for the newcomer.57 Small investors cannot presently learn of these
negotiations. This hidden information would be useful inasmuch as it would
reveal how PIPEs evaluate SPACs. A college sports coach with 100 wins
and 10 losses is more likely to advance in the market for coaches than is
another coach with 100 wins and 90 losses. Wins and losses are just a piece
of information in a large set, but both wins and losses reveal something
about the coach‟s potential and abilities.
When a PIPE rejects a SPAC investment, it signals a belief that the
SPAC will generate lower returns relative to the PIPE‟s other investment
opportunities. If, for example, the PIPE earns 15% risk-adjusted returns on
average, then small investors can reasonably infer that this PIPE believes
that the SPAC will earn less than 15%. If the SPAC earns more, then the
PIPE will have made a bad decision. Over time, investors can tally the good
and bad decisions of PIPEs, and learn whether some PIPEs are superior
evaluators. Learning of this kind already occurs by observing PIPE
57

Cf. Dmitri Basev & Jason C. Katz, How SPAC Skepticism Has Given PIPE Investors
an
Edge,
LAZARD
INSIGHTS,
May
2021,
https://www.lazardassetmanagement.com/us/en_us/research-insights/lazard-insights/spacskepticism-pipe-edge#! (noting that PIPE capital has become scarcer).
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investments. It can be enhanced by observing PIPE rejections. It is possible
that regulation will evolve to require publicly traded, or publicly offered,
companies to reveal information about rejections. Requiring a privately
owned PIPE (or SPACs) it has considered, to reveal these decisions for the
benefit of investors who consider copying the PIPE‟s investment would be a
new path for law to take. Investors would want to know not only the PIPE‟s
decision to forego an investment opportunity, but at what price this SPAC
was available. In the case of automobiles, consumers can observe that the
Avis lots are full of Toyotas, but they do not know at what price these cars
were purchased, or the price at which a comparable Honda deal might have
been struck. It is plausible that in a very efficient market, consumers could
pay for this information. This, too, is a topic best left for another day, as it
requires some thinking about strategic behavior on all sides.
To be fair, it is no small task to evaluate a given PIPE over time. Its
management may have changed, it is difficult to adjust for risk correctly,
and a PIPE‟s opportunity costs are not easily discovered. This, of course, is
a general problem in evaluating decision-makers, and in comparing them to
others in the field. Those who watch and study Shark Tank are familiar with
this problem. Among other things, the television program brings back
success stories for the audience to celebrate,58 but it does not advertise the
losing decisions made by the investors, who are repeat players and would be
easier to evaluate than founders as well as most PIPEs.
3. The PIPE‟s Early-Mover Advantage
The PIPE serves as a link on the SPAC chain because of its ability to
evaluate and select a good investment opportunity. Investors will be
skeptical of founders, especially when the latter finds a target towards the
end of the (usual two year) period before expiration, but there is no similar
reason to be skeptical of a PIPE. In turn, the PIPE is compensated, with
preferential prices, for its role in the chain. On the surface, it may appear
that a portion of its discount is attributable to buying a large block of shares
(a bulk discount so to speak) and bearing the price risk during the lock-up
period following the merger. The PIPE could, conceivably, avoid this risk
by purchasing all the desired shares on the retail market after the identity of
58

See, e.g., Success Story: The Paint Brush Cover, SHARK TANK (Feb., 13, 2015),
https://abc.com/shows/shark-tank/video/most-recent/vdka0_sf9wx9af. Another way to put
the point made in the text is that if one is offered the opportunity to invest in just one of the
sharks on the program, it would be difficult to choose among them. Viewers are not offered
information about the losing investments the make; some can be followed online, but even
then there is no information about further commitments made by the sharks.
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the target was announced. It would be logistically difficult, however, for the
PIPE to purchase a large retail stake without causing the market price to rise
through its purchase activity.59 In this sense, the SPAC is offering a
valuable service by making the bulk purchase possible.
Inasmuch as this service is valuable to the PIPE, it should receive less of
a discount. The discussion here has drawn a comparison to the information
provided to the market by an early and large purchaser of one car rather
than another. But it should be noted that in the case of cars, the final sales to
individual consumers come with all sorts of transaction costs, while the
purchase (and sale) of shares and warrants in a SPAC, both before and after
any acquisition of a target, does not involve advertising, showrooms,
promises about servicing, and other costs. In short, the PIPE provides
information that benefits public investors as well as the SPAC founders, and
it is rewarded in the form of a lower price and preferential shares, but the
precise distribution of rewards on the chain, both to PIPEs and to founders,
is difficult to predict. It is likely that this distribution depends on the state of
the SPAC market. For instance, if there is great variation in the current
batch of SPACs available to public investors, then the PIPE should be
expected to be rewarded more substantially for its evaluation capability
because its selection of a particular SPAC does more to distinguish a winner
among losers. The enhanced reward can take the form of preferential prices
or a side payment from sponsors. A sponsor team under pressure to
complete a transaction might, for example, surrender more of its founder
shares to a PIPE.
C. Other Links in the SPAC Chain
The financing chain that is discussed in this Article does of course have
other links, including those occupied by underwriters and law firms. At the
pre-documentation stage, legal counsel assists the sponsor in determining
whether a SPAC is an appropriate vehicle for achieving the sponsor‟s
objectives.60 If, for instance, the management team is simply looking to
finance a venture or pre-revenue opportunity, then a SPAC may not be the
best fit. An experienced counsel surely plays a role in determining such a
fit. Similarly, before a sponsor commits capital, counsel advises of potential
59

See Joshua Mitts, A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C.
CENTRAL L. REV. 203, 204-05 (2013) (discussing the logistical difficulty of accumulating a
large number of shares at a particular price on a retail market).
60
Lawyers have long been noted for the ability to discover and screen efficient
transactions. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 241 (1984).
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risks related to SPAC liquidation and the loss of sponsor capital. In some
cases, sponsors are referred from previous SPAC sponsors and bankers.
Pre-vetted referrals may be more likely to culminate in the business
combination of the SPAC and the target, but counsel still can proceed with
caution so that clients proceed with eyes wide open. Finally, if counsel
determines that the deal is “SPACable,” then there is the opportunity to
connect a SPAC with a bank that will serve various needs. Experienced
lawyers will also help sponsors in structuring warrants, and good work is
surely associated with avoiding long delays in arriving at agreements with
investment banks. Delays can spell the end of a deal, a fact that is impressed
upon law firm associates when they are asked to work late into the night.
In short, lawyers—and investment banks and some other participants—
are also found on the SPAC chain, and yet their compensation is not
discussed here because it is hard to see why it would be different from that
associated with an IPO or other alternatives to the SPAC chain. In all cases
it is tempting to wonder about the development of fees that are contingent
on success, but as we know from tort law, family law, and other areas,
contingency fees come with incentive problems of their own. We leave fee
structures for another day.
Lawyers also play an important role when it comes to regulatory
hurdles.61 Again, there are reasons why lawyers who deal with the SEC and
other authorities are not compensated based on outcomes; they charge fees,
and clients are free to move among vendors, known as law firms. But here it
is even clearer that SPACs present nothing new in comparison with IPOs
and other substitutes, because at present there is less regulatory oversight of
SPACs and PIPEs than of their competitors found in other means of finding
targets and assembling capital. The discussion here continues to focus on
what is different about the SPAC world.
Exchanges, like underwriters and lawyers, screen out low-quality
SPACs, or perhaps force changes in the terms of an acquisition, but their
primary role is to standardize transactions. Listing rules are blunt
instruments that largely reflect minimum standards set by law62 or a
61

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 486-87 (2007) (providing survey evidence of lawyers‟ role in
reducing regulatory costs).
62
See, e.g., NYSE Listing Manual Rule 102.6 and NASDAQ Listing Rule IM-5510
(requiring a minimum SPAC price per share of $4.00 consistent with the Securities
Exchange Act minimum required for avoiding classification as a “penny stock.” For the
classification rule, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 240.3a51-1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036767

17-Jun-22]

SPACs, PIPEs, AND COMMON INVESTORS

29

particular exchange‟s rules on minimum market value and liquidity.63 Other
listing rules for SPACs set the basic requirements for trust account
maintenance, maximum time allotted for finding a target, minimum value of
the merger in relation to the cash held by the trust, minimum number of
votes required for merger approval (a majority), and specification of
redemption rights.64 These, too, represent blunt forms of quality control and
serve more as a checklist for serializing transactions. Over time we can
expect these to change or to be eliminated, as controls generate
runarounds—much as SPACs themselves can be seen as circumventions of
rules regulating IPOs and other methods of acquisition.65 As a place for
carrying out minimal screening and substantial standardization, exchanges
serve to elevate, rather than diminish, the role of the sponsor and the PIPE
in merger screening and selection. A small investor faced with a group of
standardized SPACs relies on the sponsor team and PIPE as signals of
quality. But even optimal standardization leaves room for subcategories and
market innovation.
III. IS THE PIPE UNIQUE?
To the extent that a PIPE can be understood as a link in the investment
chain, and one that certifies SPACs, it is useful to see that in other markets
there are entities that perform a similar function. In some cases this link has
also been a recent development, while in others there is a legal or other
hurdle that stands in the way of such a function.
There are myriad settings in which small investors are unlikely to find it
worthwhile to study potential targets, and where they are willing to reward
intermediaries to certify an investment. In some settings certification is
unnecessary. An applicant who is choosing a law school in which to
63

NYSE imposes, for SPACs, a minimum aggregate market value of $100 million,
while the market value of publicly held shares must reach $80 million. NYSE Listing
Manual 102.6. There are various configurations permitted for the minimum share
requirement. Id. NASDAQ imposes smaller minimums. For instance, the total market value
of publicly held shares of a listing in the NASDAQ Capital Market is set at $3.5 million.
NASDAQ Listing Rule 5510.
64
The NYSE Listing Manual 102.6 and NASDAQ Listing Rule IM-5510 require: (1)
at least 90% of IPO gross proceeds must be deposited in trust, (2) a business combination
must be completed within 36 months, (3) one or more business combinations must have a
fair market value of at least 80% of the value held in the trust account, (4) a majority of
common shares must approve a merger, and (5) anyone who votes against the business
combination has a right to redeem shares for a pro-rated share of the cash held in the trust
account (except sponsors, family affiliates, etc.).
65
See, e.g., Coates, supra note 8 (noting looser rules with respect to forward-looking
statements in the SPAC context).
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“invest,” can see a long history of various and their job placement records.
Rankings by third-party intermediaries are also available. These providers
of information are financed by advertisements and by subscribers, but for
the most part the information they relay is easy to acquire and requires little
financial support. Some information that would be useful goes unprovided,
often because the party that creates or possesses it prefers not to reveal what
it knows. For example, a law school from which many graduates fail the bar
examination and have difficulty securing employment that makes use of a
legal education, prefers for these facts to be unknown by applicants. Over
time the American Bar Association, and in extreme cases the threat of fraud
claims by disappointed graduates, has required schools to reveal this
information.66 Vigilant alumni who are potential donors to the schools, and
state legislators in the case of public universities, care about the reputation
of the school, and they might also pressure law deans to reveal information
or to improve outcomes. In some cases, potential donors have the opposite
effect, because they want to hear good news, and law school administrators
have reason to exaggerate the quality of outcomes, often by broadcasting
the accomplishments or placements of successful students, and saying
nothing about failed bar exams and unfulfilled career plans. Overall, the
need for intermediate providers of information has been reduced by these
requirements and incentives, and this reduction takes the place of an
intermediary. In any event, an intermediary that sought to provide this
information to paying customers, would find it difficult to be sufficiently
compensated, because information that it discloses to one paying customer
is easily shared with other, non-paying, users.
The quality of other goods can be certified or ensured by warranties, by
repeat play, and some by a buyer‟s ability to observe the market for used
goods. In some markets, buyers pay for inspections, so that there are fewer
hidden defects in things like houses or used automobiles that they
purchase.67 A long list of such developments can be understood as doing
what PIPEs do; they give small investors information before the latter must
commit to a purchase or other kind of investment.
Somewhat closer to the world of SPACs, which have arisen with an eye
on modest size businesses that are viewed as ready to expand and go public,
66

See
American
Bar
Association
Standard
509,
https://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2022)
(requiring law schools to disclose employment outcomes and bar passage outcomes of
students for accreditation).
67
See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1469, 1507-08 (2018) (providing examples).
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we find large investors that move among existing opportunities in the great
stock exchanges. When Berkshire Hathaway purchases a sizeable chunk of
a publicly traded company‟s stock, other investors who are relatively illinformed know that an informed investor has found an investment
opportunity that they can now wisely grab onto. This is especially useful
information because Berkshire Hathaway (or Warren Buffett) is known to
interfere little with the management of a firm in which it invests.68 The
large investor has found an opportunity, as a SPAC claims to have done.
The acquirer is evaluating rather than providing management skills; it
affirms one link rather than two in the investment chain. Less-informed
investors are now likely to buy stock in the same target, and of course they
pay a somewhat higher price, and often drive up the price of the shares
already owned by the first mover, which can be thought of as providing
information to other investors. The target may also be ready to expand as
these stock purchases are often associated with substantial borrowing by the
target company. Warren Buffett is rewarded when the price of his Berkshire
Hathaway investment rises, the smaller investors in Berkshire Hathaway are
rewarded for their earlier investment in the firm, and are often further
rewarded when the firm borrows money and thus expands successfully.
Presumably, Berkshire Hathaway, in the manner of somewhat more
complete takeover artists, does not want to take on more risk by buying a
yet larger share of its new target; instead, it shares its insights with tagalong investors.
There are, to be sure, investment advisers and columnists that try to sell
their claimed expertise in these matters in a more direct fashion, without
having to invest huge resources on their own. But anyone can claim to be an
expert, and some advisers will be lucky and then try to profit from their past
(lucky) picks. Buffett has not only a history of good investments—though
these could be random results—but the fact that he invests a considerable
amount of his own money indicates something more than a
recommendation. Smaller investors can see that it was worth it for him and
his firm to investigate and evaluate potential investments, and they now
sensibly invest in his wake. This is what a PIPE does in its evaluation not
only of a SPAC but also of the SPAC‟s target. We should think of the
SPAC as claiming expertise in discovering a target, in negotiating a
takeover of the target, and then of helping to manage the new, enlarged
company. The PIPE tells the market whether the SPAC‟s work is well done.
68

See Marilyn Haigh, Warren Buffett on Managing People: Find the „.400 Hitters‟ and
Don‟t Tell Them How to Swing, CNBC INVESTING, Feb. 13, 2019,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/warren-buffett-on-managing-find-the-point400-hittersand-then-dont-tell-them-how-to-swing.html (describing this hands-off approach).
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The SPAC‟s founder is not itself sufficient evidence, for reasons we have
seen; it is paid early-on for its work and it is constrained by time, because it
must rush to find a target as its specified time, with or without an extension,
nears a final moment.
Consider, as a final and less obvious example of PIPE-like work, the
structure of many not-for-profit organizations. When we decide how to
support research or save lives through malaria control in distant countries, it
is difficult to find the right investment, and certainly difficult to be a
sensible, or even efficient, altruist. There are now not-for-profits that
provide information about other not-for-profits, but they necessarily do this
by studying some (of many) variables that can be learned about
“competing” not-for-profit providers. These (not-for-profit) students and
evaluators of not-for-profit (and often distant) performance, do not have an
easy job, and it is difficult to know whether they are themselves reliable. It
might for example be efficient for a not-for-profit to spend a substantial
fraction of what it receives on its own management, but this is usually taken
as a sign of waste. One university is hardly a better investment than another
simply because its president receives a lower salary than the other‟s. Law
plays a limited role here by requiring some disclosures and, most famously,
by giving favorable tax treatments to organizations that are not-for-profit.
The managers and founders can receive reasonable compensation but they
cannot receive dividends or otherwise extract funds that have been put into
the organization with favorable tax treatment. There is, however, another
way to judge universities that engage in scientific research or distant
malaria-control providers. A potential, relatively small, donor, might look to
see what a large donor does. Just as an investor looks to a PIPE for
information, a small donor might look to see what the Gates Foundation has
done.
Many NFPs (not-for-profits) try to solve the assessment problem facing
potential donors by disclosing information and specific plans. Some are
required by law to show how much of what they take in goes to managing
the entity, and to raising yet more money, rather than to working on the goal
that interests the donors.69
But very much in the style of following a PIPE, if donor X, who wants
to give $1,000 to a cause, sees that donor Y has given $100 million to that
cause, X might reason that Y has investigated the field and decided that this
69

The IRS requires a tax-exempt organization to make certain filings but none
includes a measure of performance. Private foundations must also disclose the identities of
substantial contributors. 26 CFR § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(F).
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is the best place to invest that considerable sum. It is no wonder that a
charitable cause will normally advertise Y‟s large gift, as this fact provides
information to smaller investors, like X. The conventional wisdom is that
the advertisement serves to enhance the donor‟s social standing, but another
possibility is that it motivates people like X. X can use Y, much as a small
investor uses Buffet or the behavior of a PIPE.70
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SPACS AND PIPES
A. Prediction Markets
SPACs and PIPEs, and their counterparts in other markets, have been
described here as entities that discover prospects and that confirm the
presence of skilled discoverers of investment opportunities. These
descriptions assume that some significant expense is required to carry out
investigations. However, there are situations in which small, often dispersed
parties already possess information about quality, or can easily acquire such
information, and the trick is to aggregate information rather than to acquire
it. By way of analogy, an expert might evaluate a new restaurant, but an
alternative is for many customers to record their own lived experiences. The
problem here is that there is no reward for providing the information and,
often, no reason to think that the reviews are provided by disinterested
parties.
A prediction market is one way to solve this information problem and to
assemble information from numerous providers who have some reason to
think that they can evaluate the likelihood that their own impressions are
accurate.71 Patrons, or a yet larger group of likely observers, might be
allowed the opportunity to earn money and glory by winning a competition
for predicting a measurable outcome—in this case perhaps the number of
patrons the restaurants will have with a given menu in a given month.
Waiters, regular patrons, and even competitor restaurant owners might bet
on the result by buying and selling shares in a prediction market much as
there is betting on horse races and presidential elections. This kind of
market had proved to be better than highly paid experts in assessing the first
weekend‟s ticket sales for a new film.72 The knowledge helps theater
70

Variations on this theme are discussed in Saul Levmore, Not-for-Profits, ESGs, and
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, U. CHI. BUS. (forthcoming 2022).
71
See Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 69 (2006)
(describing potential uses of prediction markets for law).
72
See Ekaterina V. Karniouchina, Are Virtual Markets Efficient Predictors of New
Product Success? The Case of the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION
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owners decide which screens to dedicate to new films. A prediction market
is likely to be effective when knowledge is spread among many parties,
though it is worth noting that if there is a single knowledgeable party, that
person can also emerge victorious in a prediction market otherwise intended
to attract numerous dispersed players. One hurdle faced by prediction
markets is that state law often regards these markets as nothing more than
gambling casinos and these are highly regulated.73
But why would a prediction market that is focused on new businesses of
the kind that SPACs currently evaluate, be more useful than a “real” market
such as a stock market—assuming that both will soon be permitted by law
without excessive regulation? A prediction market might be useful when
the parties with knowledge do not have the resources to buy shares and do
not have the risk-taking inclination to buy in highly leveraged fashion or to
buy and sell stock short. If one hundred small “investors,” like employees
and other observers,74 can evaluate a SPAC or the SPAC‟s target as well as
a PIPE, but these parties do not have substantial resources, they might
participate in a prediction market where the winner is the one that best
estimates the value of the SPAC at a specified date. Other configurations
are possible. People could purchase contracts that pay if the business
combination increases or decreases in market value by a particular
percentage, or reaches a particular revenue or profit target by an announced
date. These contracts could then be traded on an information market.
In some sense, stock markets already pull together the knowledge of
numerous and dispersed buyers and sellers, and these markets are prediction
markets. The market for SPACs, both before and after announcement of a
business combination, is no different. Initially, investors want to know
whether a sponsor team can find a good target. A purchase of shares can be
understood as a prediction of success. Once the SPAC identifies a target,
investors want to know whether its acquisition will be profitable. The
& MGMT. 470, 470 (2011) (describing the Hollywood Stock Exchange prediction market
and its success).
73
See Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation:
Securites, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 144, 196-97 (2014) (providing some examples of prediction markets that have been
highly regulated).
74
There is evidence that opinions of employees may be particularly valuable. Rankand-file employees participating in a prediction market at Hewlett-Packard outperformed
executives in forecasting printer cartridge and ink toner sales 75% of the time, and a
prediction market that included a diverse mix of employees at e.Lily more successfully
predicted FDA approval of drugs. See James Surowiecki, Smarter Than the CEO, WIRED
(Jun. 1, 2004), https://www.wired.com/2004/06/smarter-than-the-ceo/.
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purchase of shares by a PIPE can also be thought of as a prediction. While
the right to redeem protects the earlier investor, the challenge for later
public investors who face a decision to remain or be redeemed (at the time
of the merger) is to understand how much the PIPE‟s purchase of shares can
be interpreted as a seal of approval as opposed to the mere taking advantage
of insider benefits. Mandating the revelation of PIPE terms will very likely
serve as a warning system for transactions that are extremely unfavorable to
public investors. But disclosure is unlikely to do the expert work of
separating the good from the bad for the close calls. More information is
needed beyond PIPE terms.
B. Insurance
Prediction markets offer one way to elicit the information that investors
would like. Insurance is another way to find out how a well-informed party
assesses a risk, while it is also a means of avoiding risk.75 Instead of
mandating disclosure of PIPE terms, the business combination might offer
to purchase insurance against bankruptcy, or a particular magnitude of
decline in market value, such as anything greater than a 20% decline in
value from the time of merger.76 Each share of the business combination
could be coupled with this insurance, or warranty, valued proportionally to
the market value of the business combination at the time of its completion.
The counterpart to a “merger unit,” consisting of a share plus an insurance
contract, is today‟s SPAC unit, consisting of a share plus a warrant. The
insurance could separate and trade on its own, much as warrants do. If the
business combination performs well over time, the value of the insurance
contract will decline. This additional information found in a secondary
market for insurance contracts is comparable to that already available in the
stock market for the business combination‟s shares.
But merger units can be attractive when compared to one-size-fits-all
disclosure rules—especially when over-disclosure is in the air.
Combinations of skilled sponsors and target management teams will be
rewarded with lower up-front insurance costs. Less-skilled groups, that may
be inclined to provide overly generous terms to a PIPE, will pay more.
While disclosure of PIPE terms will certainly reveal something about the
quality of the business combination, insurance reveals information about the
beliefs of large investors and other insiders regarding the merger‟s market
value at a later point in time. Without insurance and other prediction
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markets, information regarding the business combination‟s value is
reflected in share price, PIPE terms, and other features of the transaction
such as the surrender of founders‟ shares, but all of these also reflect insider
benefits. Information on merger performance and insider compensation is
commingled, and insurance works to separate this information. The
disadvantage of encumbering SPACs with higher pay-to-play costs is a
resultant decrease in deal volume. But this is the price we pay for any form
of regulation, and insurance may prove comparatively superior to rules of
mandated disclosure. Prediction markets offer the advantage of avoiding
these costs, but require broad participation—and information to be held
across many parties—in order to be effective.
C. Will SPACs Survive?
We have seen that the development of SPACs and PIPEs can be
understood as filling useful roles in the market. But the discussion has also
suggested that there are substitutes for them. If, for example, law allowed
prediction markets to flourish, would PIPEs, and therefore SPACs,
disappear? Probably not, because one calls on single well-equipped
investigators who inform the market, while the other specializes in cases
where there are numerous well-informed parties who would convey
information if they had an opportunity to profit even just a little bit without
risking much on their own.
Insurance offers a more likely, and lower cost, substitute for PIPEs. It
might be offered by third parties, in which case it too counts on a limited
number of well-informed players. But small investors must be confident
that the insurer is reliable in the event of a loss, and this might require
regulation of its own. If the insurance is provided by the SPAC itself, as a
side product, smaller investors might be offered the choice of buying in
with or without what might be called a warranty, as easily as insurance. A
warranty offered by a seller is not normally subject to regulatory
supervision.
D. SPACs and Hold-outs
The arrival of SPACs can be understood as a new way of dealing with
hold-outs in corporate law. In property law, when the government wants to
develop a road, it buys land and deals with hold-outs by asserting its
eminent domain power. In corporate law, a company that wants to merge
with another, must convince enough shareholders to come along for the
ride, and it can often deal with strategic shareholders with a short-form
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merger that forces out dissenters, if 90% of the shares (at least in Delaware)
want to go along with the terms of the mergers.77 It is a kind of private law
of takings. A SPAC founder knows that it could face a similar problem, but
here its main business is to attract investors by promising to try to find a
good target. The market has thus far evolved by relying, once again, on a
supermajority “vote” of sorts, and by forcing out any dissenters by telling
them in advance that they can exit when they like, and receive what
amounts to the pre-merger and pre-finding price; they have agreed to stay
aboard or get their money back with interest.
The SPAC market can in this way be seen as yet another way to deal
with strategic dissenters, albeit in a setting where the very task of the firm is
to find an attractive target. We leave for another day this larger comparison
of methods that law and the private market provide for dealing with
dissenters, some of whom might be strategic, and in the end block efficient
combinations. The important point here is that the SPACs bring on PIPEs
who help acquire the necessary cash, so that money is something of a
substitute for votes as a tool to deal with hold-outs.
CONCLUSION
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs, have developed in
response to market opportunities, alongside legal restrictions associated
with other methods of combining capital in order to expand promising
businesses. As is so often the case, observers have been quick to find
problems where it is at least as likely that there is efficient development in
plain view. Some SPACs have, no doubt, attracted small investors while
allowing larger ones to escape legal rules. But many SPACs do the work of
allowing smaller investors to invest in new firms without paying the costs
and suffering from the favoritism inherent in IPOs. The SPACs themselves
claim to be able to find good opportunities for expanding a business idea
that is already in progress, and PIPEs then confirm their selections, and
receive better investment deals in return. At this point we are unable to say
how often the optimistic story offered here is a fair description of what is
found in reality, but it is surely promising enough that lawmakers need to be
cautious about putting hurdles in the face of SPACs and PIPEs.
The small investors pay SPACs to find targets, and they also pay PIPEs
to certify or at least signal the quality of SPAC work. PIPEs are simply
larger investors that are copied by smaller ones, and PIPEs can be thought
77

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (2019).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036767

38

SPACs, PIPEs, AND COMMON INVESTORS

[17-Jun-22

of as compensated by small investors or by the SPACs they acknowledge to
be good search firms and good investments. This Article has emphasized
the interesting role played by this large investor, or PIPE, among the other
links in the chain of the investment machine that is associated with the
arrival of SPACs.
Seen this way, it is also clear that the development of SPACs and PIPEs
should not have been unexpected. Smaller investors everywhere need
guidance from larger ones that had reason to invest in discovering things
about their targets. These intermediaries are compensated in a variety of
ways. It is possible that a new development will be that SPACs offer a kind
of warranty, or insurance, to risk averse and ill-informed small investors
they hope to retain or attract. It is even possible that a prediction market will
develop so that informed parties without serious capital to invest will have a
means of profiting from their knowledge. Whether this is a desirable
development or an opportunity for a new form of unhealthy insider trading
remains to be seen.
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